Encode Sanctions in the Regulations

[niemela]

Resolves #5

Presented separately from the main package so it can be discussed and voted on its own merits. Builds on the package PR (this PR is based on that branch and retargets to main automatically when the package merges): it uses the Member vocabulary (#3) and takes the S2.11 number after the new S2.10 (#7).

What changes

• New S2.11: the GA may impose Sanctions on a Member. A Sanctioned Member may not display its name or flag at the IOI, is not considered present at the IOI, may not vote at the GA, and may not host the IOI. Its Contestants may participate in the Competition, and members of its Delegation may attend and speak at GA meetings. Imposing requires a 2/3 GA majority; lifting a simple majority.
• New A2.11: the IC must make sure the GA is provided with a written justification before the vote; a Sanctioned Member may appeal to the GA at each subsequent IOI.

Why

As long as sanctions exist, their mechanics — effect, imposition, lifting — should be in the Regulations, so the GA is not repeatedly overriding its own rules ad hoc. "Not considered present at the IOI" does the quorum and threshold arithmetic in one clause, while the Member's people retain attendance and speaking rights: the Member is not there; its contestants are.

IC endorsement: endorsed by the IC at its meetings at IOI 2026, Tashkent.

[davidm-ioi]

I think when drafting the regulation we should try to avoid the situation of having continual votes on ongoing sanctions, which is divisive and distracting from what the IOI should be about. I would like to suggest that motions to lift (or impose) sanctions should require the support of say 5 or 10 delegations in order to be considered.

(Generally once we have made a decision we don't just come back for another vote next year unless circumstances change. Obviously we can't codify "changed circumstances" in the regulations but this would be a way of checking that at least a few delegations think that something has changed)

[madhavan-mukund]

I think when drafting the regulation we should try to avoid the situation of having continual votes on ongoing sanctions, which is divisive and distracting from what the IOI should be about. I would like to suggest that motions to lift (or impose) sanctions should require the support of say 5 or 10 delegations in order to be considered.

(Generally once we have made a decision we don't just come back for another vote next year unless circumstances change. Obviously we can't codify "changed circumstances" in the regulations but this would be a way of checking that at least a few delegations think that something has changed)

I definitely agree with this. There should be some minimum threshold of support for a motion to reverse a sanction.

[andvise]

I think when drafting the regulation we should try to avoid the situation of having continual votes on ongoing sanctions, which is divisive and distracting from what the IOI should be about. I would like to suggest that motions to lift (or impose) sanctions should require the support of say 5 or 10 delegations in order to be considered.

(Generally once we have made a decision we don't just come back for another vote next year unless circumstances change. Obviously we can't codify "changed circumstances" in the regulations but this would be a way of checking that at least a few delegations think that something has changed)

Agreed! This would guarantee a minimum level of support for a proposal and would reduce long discussions.

[niemela]

I think when drafting the regulation we should try to avoid the situation of having continual votes on ongoing sanctions, which is divisive and distracting from what the IOI should be about. I would like to suggest that motions to lift (or impose) sanctions should require the support of say 5 or 10 delegations in order to be considered.

We will vote on an amendment to this effect in GA (if this survives the sanctions vote).

[ziruili]

I am in favour of requiring 2/3rds of the GA vote to lift sanctions.

This will help avoid continual discussion and votes on ongoing sanctions. Hopefully a motion to lift sanctions would only be proposed if there is a genuine chance of receiving a 2/3rds majority, which will only occur when there is a large change in the GA’s sentiment.

Also, the current system of requiring 2/3rds to impose and a simple majority to remove seems unbalanced. I understand that it is what is currently aligned with the regulations, but I’m not sure if that is what the GA wants.

[niemela]

Also, the current system of requiring 2/3rds to impose and a simple majority to remove seems unbalanced. I understand that it is what is currently aligned with the regulations, but I’m not sure if that is what the GA wants.

I would argue that having 2/3 in both directions is actually more unbalanced. That would mean that you need a very string support in GA to impose sanction (2/3), this seems reasonable, but only very weak support in GA to keep them (1/3).

It is already the case that for sanctions to be removed, the support for them needs to lower from 2/3 to 1/2, which is quite significant. I.e. we can definitely have sanctions even when there is less than 2/3 support for them in the GA (which is actually currently the case).