Add mojo-security-validation opengrep rule for Chromium#865
Add mojo-security-validation opengrep rule for Chromium#865
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| public: | ||
| // SHOULD TRIGGER: File path without validation (dangerous) | ||
| // ruleid: chromium-mojo-privilege-validation | ||
| void ReadFile(const base::FilePath& file_path) override { |
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reported by reviewdog 🐶
[opengrep] Mojo interface methods that receive privilege-presuming data (like file paths,
origins, or URLs) should validate this data using ChildProcessSecurityPolicy
before use. Untrusted processes can send arbitrary data over IPC.
Use methods like CanAccessDataForOrigin(), CanReadFile(), etc.
Source: https://github.com/brave/security-action/blob/main/assets/opengrep_rules/client/mojo-security-validation.yaml
Cc @thypon @cdesouza-chromium
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| // SHOULD TRIGGER: URL without origin validation (dangerous) | ||
| // ruleid: chromium-mojo-privilege-validation | ||
| void FetchResource(const GURL& url, int render_process_id) override { |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
reported by reviewdog 🐶
[opengrep] Mojo interface methods that receive privilege-presuming data (like file paths,
origins, or URLs) should validate this data using ChildProcessSecurityPolicy
before use. Untrusted processes can send arbitrary data over IPC.
Use methods like CanAccessDataForOrigin(), CanReadFile(), etc.
Source: https://github.com/brave/security-action/blob/main/assets/opengrep_rules/client/mojo-security-validation.yaml
Cc @thypon @cdesouza-chromium
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| // SHOULD TRIGGER: Origin without validation (dangerous) | ||
| // ruleid: chromium-mojo-privilege-validation | ||
| void AccessOriginData(const url::Origin& origin, int pid) override { |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
reported by reviewdog 🐶
[opengrep] Mojo interface methods that receive privilege-presuming data (like file paths,
origins, or URLs) should validate this data using ChildProcessSecurityPolicy
before use. Untrusted processes can send arbitrary data over IPC.
Use methods like CanAccessDataForOrigin(), CanReadFile(), etc.
Source: https://github.com/brave/security-action/blob/main/assets/opengrep_rules/client/mojo-security-validation.yaml
Cc @thypon @cdesouza-chromium
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Enforce privilege validation in Mojo IPC handlers to prevent privilege escalation through IPC message spoofing.
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Opengrep Findings📈 Comparison Results
Summary by Rule
Detailed Findings
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| patterns: | ||
| - patterns: | ||
| - pattern-either: | ||
| - pattern-regex: void\s+\w+\([^)]*base::FilePath[^)]*\)\s*override\s*\{ |
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as mentioned in the original PR I think this is far too broad and it would be better to target the mojom files directly instead of the cpp unless you can filter on classes that subclass mojom::*?
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Supersedes: #855