Define tech stack: stakereloadxs#22
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…ploy system - Next.js 14 App Router frontend with TailwindCSS + Framer Motion - Dynamic brand theming via CSS variables loaded from JSON configs - Full page set: home, /affiliates, /payment-success, /payment-cancel - Sections: Hero, Features, Demo, Metrics, Services, Shop, Blog, FAQ - PaymentModal with Telegram validation + NOWPayments API integration - /api/payments/create route proxying NOWPayments invoice creation - Brand config system: configs/brands/stakereloadxs.json - Multi-brand deploy script: scripts/deploy.sh (Vercel/VPS/Docker) - Dockerfile for containerized deploys - New brand deployable by adding a JSON config + running deploy.sh <brand> https://claude.ai/code/session_01D1FwArh4h4vqZGqLzCoXxo
… images, cron
User Journey Maps (docs/USER_JOURNEY_MAPS.md):
- Mermaid journey/state/sequence diagrams for all 5 personas:
Prospective Customer, First-Time Customer, Returning Customer,
Super Agent, Administrator
ASCII Design Token Reference (docs/DESIGN_TOKENS_ASCII.md):
- 5-resolution ASCII mockups (XS/SM/MD/LG/XL) for every token category:
color, background layers, typography, border/radius, shadow, animation
Design Token Package (packages/tokens/src/tokens.ts):
- Full base scale (colors, fonts, spacing, radii, shadows, motion)
- 5 brand tone presets: aggressive, corporate, playful, underground, premium
- generateCSSVars() — produces :root { } block from any palette
- animationPresets: smooth, fast, glitch, static
- All tokens consumed by CSS vars, Tailwind, admin preview and deploy
Admin Panel (apps/admin/):
- Zustand brand store with draft/deploy/preview state
- BrandFormPanel: id, name, domain, tagline, cta, copy variant, animation
- TokenPanel: tone preset selector + per-token color picker + live CSS output
- PreviewPanel: live component render + breakpoint scale + :root preview
- DeployPanel: provider selector (Vercel/VPS/Docker), build log stream,
re-deploy existing brands, shell command preview
/status endpoint (apps/web/src/app/api/status/route.ts):
- Returns brand identity, deployment metadata, health checks, features,
analytics config, Cloudflare DNS, sales config in JSON
- Checks: NOWPayments API, DNS resolution, analytics config
- Template variables from brand config: domain, name, id, packages
- /status page (StatusClient.tsx): styled dashboard, auto-refreshes 30s
OG Image Generator (apps/web/src/app/og/route.tsx):
- Edge route using Next.js ImageResponse / Satori
- Dynamic slugs: /og, /og?page=affiliates, /og?page=shop,
/og?page=status, /og?pkg=<id>
- All colors derived from brand config theme tokens
- Wired into layout.tsx + affiliates metadata
Cron Job (apps/web/src/app/api/cron/refresh-stats/route.ts):
- Runs every 15 minutes via Vercel cron (vercel.json configured)
- Refreshes: NOWPayments health, DNS resolution, analytics config snapshot
- Auth: Bearer CRON_SECRET header
- VPS fallback: */15 * * * * curl command in .env.example
https://claude.ai/code/session_01D1FwArh4h4vqZGqLzCoXxo
next.config.ts TypeScript support was only added in Next.js 15. Convert to next.config.js with JSDoc type annotation to maintain type hints. https://claude.ai/code/session_01D1FwArh4h4vqZGqLzCoXxo
…loses the comment block, causing "Expression expected" syntax error This commit fixes the issue reported at apps/web/src/app/api/cron/refresh-stats/route.ts:9 ## Bug Description The JSDoc comment in `apps/web/src/app/api/cron/refresh-stats/route.ts` at line 9 contained the cron schedule syntax `*/15 * * * *`. The `*/` sequence is interpreted by the JavaScript parser as the closing delimiter of the JSDoc block, causing the comment to terminate prematurely. This leaves the remaining text on the same line as unparseable code, resulting in a "Expression expected" syntax error during the Next.js build. Additionally, the angle bracket syntax in `https://<domain>/api/cron/refresh-stats` can cause issues in JSDoc parsing. **When it manifests:** During the Next.js build process (webpack compilation), the TypeScript/JavaScript parser encounters the malformed JSDoc and throws a compilation error, preventing deployment. **Impact:** The build fails completely, blocking deployment to production. ## Fix Applied The fix involved two changes to line 9: 1. **Wrapped the cron expression in backticks** (`*/15 * * * *`) to properly escape it within the JSDoc comment. This prevents the `*/` from being interpreted as a comment closure. 2. **Replaced the placeholder `<domain>` with a concrete example** (`example.com`). This removes the angle bracket syntax that can be problematic in JSDoc parsing and provides a clearer example URL. The corrected line now reads: ``` * External cron (VPS): `*/15 * * * *` curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $CRON_SECRET" https://example.com/api/cron/refresh-stats ``` This maintains the validity of the JSDoc block structure while preserving the documentation's clarity and correctness. Co-authored-by: Vercel <vercel[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: 4eckd <playxrewards@gmail.com>
4eckd
added
documentation
![vercel[bot]](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/in/8329?s=60&v=4){kind=small}
Build fixes: - next 14.2.5 → 15.5.13 (patches security vuln from 2025-12-11) - eslint 8.57 → 9.39.4 + eslint-config-next 16.2.0 (ESLint 9 flat config) - Add eslint.config.mjs (ESLint 9 flat config via FlatCompat) - Pin engines.node to "20.x" to suppress Vercel auto-upgrade warning Monorepo: - Add package.json + stub index for packages/ui, branding, copy, analytics - Remove transpilePackages (no local package imports in web app yet) - Remove unused @fused-gaming/* tsconfig path aliases https://claude.ai/code/session_01D1FwArh4h4vqZGqLzCoXxo
…into claude/define-tech-stack-C37J3
Vercel was scanning the repo root for `next` in package.json and failing with "No Next.js version detected". Fix by adding a root vercel.json that explicitly sets framework, buildCommand, and outputDirectory to point at apps/web. Consolidates crons/headers config from the removed apps/web/vercel.json. https://claude.ai/code/session_01D1FwArh4h4vqZGqLzCoXxo
…peScript source files instead of following proper package.json conventions for TypeScript-only workspace packages
This commit fixes the issue reported at packages/ui/package.json:4
## Bug Analysis
### Why This Is An Issue
The four new monorepo packages (`@fused-gaming/ui`, `@fused-gaming/analytics`, `@fused-gaming/branding`, `@fused-gaming/copy`) all had incorrect package.json configurations:
**Original configuration:**
```json
{
"main": "./src/index.ts",
"types": "./src/index.ts",
"exports": { ".": "./src/index.ts" }
}
```
**Problems with this configuration:**
1. **Violates Node.js conventions**: The `main` field should point to CommonJS-compatible JavaScript files, not TypeScript source files. This field is for runtime module resolution.
2. **Conflates runtime and type resolution**: The `types` field (for TypeScript) and `main` field (for runtime) serve different purposes. They shouldn't both point to the same `.ts` file.
3. **Package manager confusion**: Even though these are private workspace packages, npm/pnpm tools that inspect the package metadata may expect `main` to resolve to an actual CommonJS module or JavaScript file.
4. **Improper exports configuration**: The modern `exports` field should use conditional exports with `types` and `default` conditions when dealing with TypeScript packages.
5. **Inconsistency across packages**: The `ui` package had `./src/index.ts` while others had `./index.ts`, showing lack of standardization.
### When This Manifests
While these specific stub packages don't have dependencies and aren't currently imported by any code, the configuration would cause issues when:
* The packages are actually used by applications
* Tools try to resolve the main entry point
* Module bundlers process the workspace
* Type checkers try to resolve module entry points
### Fix Applied
Removed the incorrect `main` field and restructured the configuration to use proper conditional exports:
**New configuration:**
```json
{
"types": "./index.ts",
"exports": {
".": {
"types": "./index.ts",
"default": "./index.ts"
}
}
}
```
**Why this works:**
* Removes the problematic `main` field that violated conventions
* Keeps `types` field for TypeScript type resolution
* Uses proper conditional exports with `types` and `default` conditions
* Follows modern Node.js package.json conventions for TypeScript packages
* TypeScript will properly resolve modules using the `exports.types` field
* Runtime resolution (if needed) will use the `default` condition with the `.ts` file
This is the correct pattern for private TypeScript workspace packages that use `exports` field for module resolution.
Co-authored-by: Vercel <vercel[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: 4eckd <playxrewards@gmail.com>
…aturely closes the comment block, causing syntax error This commit fixes the issue reported at apps/web/src/app/api/cron/refresh-stats/route.ts:9 ## Bug Explanation The JSDoc comment in the file contained the text `` `*/15 * * * *` ``, which uses the cron step syntax `*/`. In JSDoc multi-line comments (which use `/** ... */`), the sequence `*/` is interpreted as the end-of-comment marker regardless of whether it appears inside backticks or other contexts. This causes the comment to close prematurely at that `*/`, leaving the rest of the content outside the comment block, resulting in a "SyntaxError [ERR_INVALID_TYPESCRIPT_SYNTAX]: Expression expected". This error was confirmed by testing with Node.js's built-in TypeScript parser. A simple test case with `/** Test comment with` */15 `*/` consistently reproduces the error. ## Fix Applied The patch removes the problematic `*/15` cron syntax from the comment and replaces it with an equivalent cron expression (0,15,30,45 * * * *) that already appears elsewhere in the same comment. This prevents the comment from closing prematurely while maintaining the documentation's intent and accuracy. The fix: 1. Removes the problematic `*/15` cron syntax from inside the comment 2. Provides an equivalent cron expression that works: `0,15,30,45 * * * *` 3. Maintains readability and documentation intent 4. Resolves the syntax error, allowing the file to parse correctly Verification: The patched code parses successfully without syntax errors, while the original code reproduces the "Expression expected" error. Co-authored-by: Vercel <vercel[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: 4eckd <playxrewards@gmail.com>
…tly to `data.paymentUrl` from API response without validation, allowing potential XSS/redirect attacks
This commit fixes the issue reported at apps/web/src/components/ui/PaymentModal.tsx:48
## Bug Explanation
The PaymentModal component (line 48-50) directly assigns `data.paymentUrl` from the NOWPayments API response to `window.location.href` without any validation:
```javascript
if (data?.paymentUrl) {
window.location.href = data.paymentUrl;
}
```
This creates multiple security vulnerabilities:
1. **Open Redirect Attacks**: An attacker who compromises the API, performs a MITM attack, or exploits any server vulnerability could inject URLs pointing to phishing sites. Users would be redirected without any warning, potentially harvesting credentials or installing malware.
2. **Protocol-based XSS**: Malicious URLs like `javascript:alert('XSS')` or `data:text/html,<script>alert('XSS')</script>` could execute arbitrary JavaScript in the user's browser context.
3. **Defense in Depth Failure**: Even though NOWPayments is a trusted third-party, the principle of defense in depth requires validating all external input before using it in security-critical operations.
When this manifests: The vulnerability is immediately exploitable if the API endpoint is compromised, during MITM attacks, or if the backend server is breached. Users could be silently redirected to malicious domains.
Impact: Users could lose funds, have credentials compromised, or be infected with malware. The payment flow could be completely hijacked.
## Fix Explanation
A two-part solution was implemented and verified:
1. **Created URL Validation Utility** (`apps/web/src/lib/validation.ts`):
* `isValidRedirectUrl(url, allowedDomains)` function that validates URLs using the browser's native `URL` constructor
* Blocks dangerous protocols (only allows `http:` and `https:`)
* Validates against a whitelist of allowed domains (nowpayments.io)
* Handles edge cases and malformed URLs safely by catching parsing exceptions
* Tested and verified with 10 security test cases (all pass)
2. **Updated PaymentModal** (`apps/web/src/components/ui/PaymentModal.tsx`):
* Imported the validation function
* Changed the redirect logic to: `if (data?.paymentUrl && isValidRedirectUrl(data.paymentUrl, ["nowpayments.io"]))`
* If URL exists but fails validation, throws an error that gets caught and displayed to the user
* Maintains backward compatibility with the no-URL case
The fix ensures that even if the API is compromised or responses are tampered with, only legitimate NOWPayments URLs will be used for navigation. Invalid URLs are treated as errors, preventing silent failures and alerting users to potential issues.
Co-authored-by: Vercel <vercel[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: 4eckd <playxrewards@gmail.com>
…ly into JavaScript code via dangerouslySetInnerHTML without escaping
This commit fixes the issue reported at apps/web/src/app/layout.tsx:78
## Bug Explanation
The Google Analytics ID (`gaId`) was directly interpolated into a JavaScript template string using standard template literal syntax:
```javascript
gtag('config', '
```
This is a **critical XSS vulnerability** because:
1. Environment variables are untrusted input (could be compromised or misconfigured)
2. If `gaId` contains quotes, backticks, or semicolons, it can break out of the string literal and inject arbitrary JavaScript
3. Example attack: `gaId = "G-123'); malicious_code('` would result in executable malicious code
Similar vulnerabilities existed with the Cloudflare beacon token (`cfBeacon`), which was also interpolated without escaping in two places:
* Line 53: In the metadata object
* Line 85: In the script tag attribute
## Fix Explanation
I replaced all three instances of direct string interpolation with `JSON.stringify()`:
1. **gaId in Google Analytics script** (line 78):
* Before: `gtag('config', '`
* After: `gtag('config',`
2. **cfBeacon in metadata** (line 53):
* Before: `` `{"token": " ``
* After: `JSON.stringify({ token: process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_CF_BEACON })`
3. **cfBeacon in script attribute** (line 85):
* Before: `` `{"token": " ``
* After: `JSON.stringify({ token: cfBeacon })`
`JSON.stringify()` properly escapes all special characters, ensuring that even if the environment variable contains quotes, backticks, or other special characters, they cannot break out of the string context and execute arbitrary code. The resulting values are always valid JSON strings that are safe to embed in JavaScript or HTML contexts.
Co-authored-by: Vercel <vercel[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: 4eckd <playxrewards@gmail.com>
…t without proper escaping, allowing potential string escape and code injection if these configuration values are compromised This commit fixes the issue reported at apps/web/src/app/layout.tsx:105 ## Why This is a Bug The Tawk widget configuration used direct template literal interpolation without escaping: ```javascript s1.src='https://embed.tawk.to/ ``` While the current configuration values are safe (alphanumeric IDs), the code pattern is inherently vulnerable. If either `propertyId` or `widgetId` ever contained special characters like single quotes, backticks, or backslashes, an attacker could break out of the string and inject arbitrary JavaScript code. For example, a malicious propertyId like `123'; alert('xss'); '456` would result in: ```javascript s1.src='https://embed.tawk.to/123'; alert('xss'); '456/...'; ``` This breaks the string literal and executes injected code. Although the data currently comes from static JSON files bundled at build time (not user input), the code is fragile and doesn't follow secure coding practices for embedding values in JavaScript via `dangerouslySetInnerHTML`. ## How the Fix Works The fix uses `JSON.stringify()` to properly escape the values: ```javascript s1.src='https://embed.tawk.to/' + ``` `JSON.stringify()`: 1. Wraps strings in quotes 2. Escapes special characters (quotes, backslashes, control characters, etc.) 3. Prevents breaking out of string literals 4. Is the standard safe technique for embedding values in dynamically generated JavaScript With this fix, even malicious input would be safely escaped and treated as string data, not code. The final URL is correctly constructed at runtime when the browser concatenates the string literals. Co-authored-by: Vercel <vercel[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: 4eckd <playxrewards@gmail.com>
… unauthorized users to retrieve sensitive cached status snapshots
This commit fixes the issue reported at apps/web/src/app/api/cron/refresh-stats/route.ts:98
## Bug Description
The POST endpoint in `/api/cron/refresh-stats/route.ts` (line 103-108) lacks authentication, while the GET endpoint properly validates a CRON_SECRET bearer token. This is a security vulnerability because:
1. **Inconsistent auth**: The GET endpoint (lines 42-50) validates the authorization header:
```typescript
const cronSecret = process.env.CRON_SECRET;
if (cronSecret) {
const auth = req.headers.get("authorization");
if (auth !== `Bearer
```
But the POST endpoint accepts no parameters and performs no auth check.
2. **Sensitive data exposure**: The POST endpoint returns `lastSnapshot` containing:
* `nowpaymentsOk` - Payment system health status
* `dnsOk` and `resolvedTo` - DNS resolution results
* GA configuration status
* Cloudflare beacon configuration status
* Response timing information
Any unauthorized user could call POST to retrieve this operational intelligence for reconnaissance.
3. **Attack scenario**: An attacker can repeatedly call the POST endpoint without authentication to learn:
* Whether payment processing is operational
* DNS resolution results for the domain
* Analytics and monitoring configuration details
* System response times
## Fix Applied
Added the same authentication check to the POST endpoint that the GET endpoint uses:
* Changed function signature from `POST()` to `POST(req: NextRequest)` to accept the request
* Added identical CRON_SECRET validation block before processing the cached snapshot
* Maintains consistency across both endpoints
* Returns 401 Unauthorized if the bearer token is missing or invalid (when CRON_SECRET is configured)
Co-authored-by: Vercel <vercel[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: 4eckd <playxrewards@gmail.com>
… and credits parameters allows attackers to create payment invoices with arbitrary values
This commit fixes the issue reported at apps/web/src/app/api/payments/create/route.ts:15
## Bug Analysis
### Why This Happens
The `/api/payments/create` endpoint accepts `packageId`, `packageName`, `price`, and `credits` from the request body without validating them against the server-side brand configuration. While the client-side code correctly sends these values from the configured `brand.creditPackages`, the API endpoint has no safeguards against direct API calls with malicious values.
### When It Manifests
Any time an attacker directly calls the payment creation endpoint with:
* A non-existent `packageId`
* Mismatched `packageName`, `price`, or `credits` values
* Specially crafted values designed to exploit the payment provider
### Impact
1. **Fraud Risk**: An attacker could create a payment invoice for $5 but label it as a $1000 package, then claim they purchased premium credits
2. **Order Confusion**: Payment provider records would contain misleading order descriptions
3. **Injection Attacks**: If the payment provider has any string interpretation vulnerabilities, malicious package names could be exploited
4. **Reputation Risk**: Customers might see incorrect order details, causing trust issues
### Example Attack Scenario
```
POST /api/payments/create
{
"packageId": "malicious-pkg",
"packageName": "Premium Package (Fake)",
"price": 1, // Attack pays $1 instead of $100
"credits": 1000000, // Claims to get 1M credits
"telegram": "@validuser"
}
```
## Fix Applied
The fix validates all package data against the authoritative server-side brand configuration:
1. **Loads the brand config** - Uses `loadBrandConfig()` to get the trusted configuration
2. **Looks up the package by ID** - Ensures the packageId actually exists in configured packages
3. **Validates all fields match** - Compares packageName, price, and credits against the server config
4. **Rejects mismatches** - Returns 400 Bad Request if any field doesn't match
5. **Uses validated data** - All values sent to NOWPayments come from the server config, never from user input
This ensures:
* Only configured packages can be purchased
* The price and credits are always correct
* Package names match their configuration
* No injection or manipulation is possible
Co-authored-by: Vercel <vercel[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: 4eckd <playxrewards@gmail.com>
…nvironment variable is not configured, allowing unauthorized access to cached status snapshots
This commit fixes the issue reported at apps/web/src/app/api/cron/refresh-stats/route.ts:111
## Bug Explanation
The cron endpoint had a critical authentication bypass vulnerability:
**Root Cause:** Both GET and POST endpoints used an optional authentication pattern:
```typescript
const cronSecret = process.env.CRON_SECRET;
if (cronSecret) { // Only enforces auth IF secret is set
// authentication check
}
```
This means if `CRON_SECRET` environment variable is not configured (undefined/empty), the entire authentication block is skipped.
**Impact:**
1. **Misconfiguration Risk**: If CRON_SECRET is accidentally not set in production (which it wasn't in `.env.example`), the endpoint becomes completely open to the public
2. **Unauthorized Data Access**: Attackers can call `/api/cron/refresh-stats` without credentials to retrieve cached status snapshots containing operational details (payment status, DNS health, GA configuration status, Cloudflare beacon status)
3. **Violates Documentation**: The file's header states "Auth: Bearer token via CRON_SECRET env var" but the implementation makes this optional
This is a **security vulnerability** because:
- The endpoint exposes operational/system information
- Authentication should be mandatory, not optional
- The absence of a secret should cause failure (fail-closed), not permission (fail-open)
## Fix Explanation
Changed the authentication logic to **fail-closed**: if CRON_SECRET is not configured, the endpoint returns a 500 error instead of allowing access.
**Changes made:**
1. **GET endpoint (line 43-47):** Added explicit check that fails if CRON_SECRET is missing:
```typescript
const cronSecret = process.env.CRON_SECRET;
if (!cronSecret) {
return NextResponse.json({ error: "Cron secret not configured" }, { status: 500 });
}
// Authentication check always executed
```
2. **POST endpoint (line 113-117):** Applied the same fix for consistency
3. **Updated `.env.example`:** Added CRON_SECRET documentation to make it clear this variable must be configured in production
**Why this fixes it:**
- Authentication is now **mandatory**, not conditional
- Misconfiguration results in a clear 500 error rather than silently allowing access
- Both endpoints now enforce the same security requirement
- Developers are alerted to configure CRON_SECRET via updated .env.example
Co-authored-by: Vercel <vercel[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: 4eckd <playxrewards@gmail.com>
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