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68 lines (63 loc) · 2.69 KB
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# cargo-deny configuration for CoordiNode.
# Run: cargo deny check licenses
[licenses]
# Allow these licenses (CE is AGPL-3.0, dependencies must be compatible)
allow = [
"MIT",
"Apache-2.0",
"Apache-2.0 WITH LLVM-exception",
"BSD-2-Clause",
"BSD-3-Clause",
"ISC",
"Unicode-3.0",
"Zlib",
"BSL-1.0",
"MPL-2.0",
"AGPL-3.0-only",
"CC0-1.0",
"CDLA-Permissive-2.0",
"0BSD",
]
confidence-threshold = 0.8
[licenses.private]
ignore = true
[advisories]
ignore = [
# proc-macro-error2 marked unmaintained upstream; pulled transitively
# via include-flate-codegen. Tracking upstream migration; safe to
# ignore in CI until include-flate drops the dep.
"RUSTSEC-2026-0173",
# rsa "Marvin Attack" (timing sidechannel on RSA private-key operations).
# Reached only via jsonwebtoken's pure-Rust `rust_crypto` backend (RSA JWT
# verification in the REST proxy). No fixed `rsa` release exists (latest is
# 0.10.0-rc; the advisory lists patched: []). We deliberately keep the
# `rust_crypto` backend over jsonwebtoken's `aws_lc_rs` backend, which would
# reintroduce a C/asm dependency (ADR-013: pure-Rust, no FFI). JWT verify is a
# public-key operation, so the private-key timing leak is not exploitable here.
# Revisit once RustCrypto ships a constant-time `rsa` stable.
"RUSTSEC-2023-0071",
# rustls-webpki 0.102.x CRL / name-constraint advisories. Pulled transitively
# by rustls-rustcrypto 0.0.2-alpha (pure-Rust crypto provider, ADR-013 no-FFI),
# which pins ^0.102 and has no newer published release, so an update cannot
# resolve them. Inter-node mTLS uses a private CA with directly-issued node
# certs — we parse no CRLs and rely on no name constraints, so these code
# paths are not exercised. Revisit when rustls-rustcrypto ships on
# webpki >= 0.103.
"RUSTSEC-2026-0104", # reachable panic in CRL parsing
"RUSTSEC-2026-0098", # name constraints for URI names incorrectly accepted
"RUSTSEC-2026-0099", # name constraints accepted for wildcard certs
"RUSTSEC-2026-0049", # CRLs not considered authoritative by distribution point
# `paste` marked unmaintained (author archived the repo). Pulled transitively
# (proc-macro helper) and has no security impact — it is a compile-time macro
# crate with no runtime surface. No drop-in replacement is wired by our deps
# yet; safe to ignore until they migrate to `pastey`.
"RUSTSEC-2024-0436",
]
[bans]
multiple-versions = "allow"
wildcards = "allow"
[sources]
unknown-registry = "deny"
unknown-git = "deny"
allow-registry = ["https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"]
allow-git = ["https://github.com/structured-world/rust-stemmers"]