Audit priority: P3.
Invalid socket-message logging serializes raw hostile payloads.
Refs:
What happens:
Rejected socket messages are logged with message: data, and non-scalar log attributes are stringified. This happens on the boundary rejection path, before the payload has a trusted shape.
Why this matters:
- Malformed input can drive avoidable allocation and log volume.
- The issue is secondary because normal message shapes have validation limits, but arbitrary invalid objects can still hit this path repeatedly.
Recommended direction:
- Log bounded metadata only: rejection reason, tool/type tags, approximate payload size, socket id, board, and client IP.
- Avoid logging the full raw message object for invalid socket payloads.
- Add a regression test for oversized/malformed invalid payloads that verifies bounded logs.
Audit priority: P3.
Invalid socket-message logging serializes raw hostile payloads.
Refs:
What happens:
Rejected socket messages are logged with
message: data, and non-scalar log attributes are stringified. This happens on the boundary rejection path, before the payload has a trusted shape.Why this matters:
Recommended direction: